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WHAT'S WORSE, NUCLEAR WASTE OR THE UNITED 
STATES' FAILED POLICY FOR ITS DISPOSAL? 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America is a nuclear nation. Despite indi-
viduals and organizations opposed to nuclear energy, 1 the reality 
is that nuclear power is an integral part of our nation and world. 2 
In the United States specifically, nuclear power plays a vital role. 
Just less than 20% of the electricity produced in the United 
States comes from nuclear power. 3 Sixty-one commercial nuclear 
power plants currently operate in thirty states.1 Furthermore, 
nuclear power is the most abundant clean energy source, account-
ing for roughly 60% of the non-fossil fuel electricity generated in 
the United States.5 Additionally, the United States Navy is built 
around nuclear energy. As of 2009, approximately 45% of the Na-
vy's ships were nuclear powered, with 103 reactors powering 
eleven aircraft carriers and seventy-one submarines.6 
Whether or not the United States continues to use nuclear 
power into the future, the country will be left with the remnants 
1. See generally Karl S. Coplan, The Externalities of Nuclear Power: First, Assume 
We Have a Can Opener ... , 35 ECOLOGY L. CUHRENTS 17 (2008) (arguing that the benefits 
of nuclear power are not worth the long term impacts of nuclear energy production). 
2. See Alex Funk & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving the Im-
passe in United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113, 114 (2013) (stating that 
nuclear power accounts for 13.5% of the world's electricity). 
3. Nuclear Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplain 
ed/index.cfm?page=nuclear_home#tab2 (last updated Sept. 8, 2014). 
4. How Many Nuclear Power Plants Are in the United States, and Where Are They 
Located?, Frequently Ashed Questions, U.S. ENEHGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/faqs/faq/cfm?id=207&t=3 (last updated Jan. 22, 2015); see also Nuclear Power in the 
USA, WonLD NUCLEAH Ass'N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Count 
ries-'l'-Z/USA-Nuclear--Power/ (last updated Feb. 2015). 
5. See What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 (last updated June 13, 2014) 
(stating that 67% of electricity in the United States is generated by fossil fuels and 19% by 
nuclear; therefore, nuclear energy accounts for 57% of the remaining 33% of energy not 
generated by fossil fuels). 
6. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE UNITED STATES NAVAL 
NUCLEAH PROPULSION PHOGHJ\M 1 (2009). 
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of its past nuclear usage for generations to come. After a certain 
period of time, the uranium fuel inside a nuclear reactor is no 
longer capable of fission. 1 When this point is reached, the reactor 
must be refueled, which involves removing the old uranium-
spent nuclear fuel ("SNF")-and replacing it with new uranium.8 
SNF is highly radioactive and can be hazardous to humans for 
tens of thousands of years. 9 There are currently about 72,000 
metric tons of SNF being stored on site at commercial nuclear 
power plants across the country. 10 However, this figure does not 
include the 13,000 metric tons of SNF and other radioactive 
waste generated as a byproduct of the defense industry and in the 
custody of the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") at 
various locations around the country. 11 
So, what is the government's plan for all of this highly hazard· 
ous nuclear waste? Well, currently there is no real plan. 12 As a re· 
sult of overly restrictive legislation and political fighting, the 
United States has been unable to devise a solution to the problem 
of where to safely store the ever-increasing stockpile of nuclear 
waste. 13 The status quo of leaving SNF sitting on-site at nuclear 
power plants raises safety concerns and questions about the abil-
ity to use those locations for some other purpose in the future. 
Critics have raised concerns about SNF stored at power plants 
being susceptible to terrorism and natural disasters. 14 Additional-
ly, under the current scheme, SNF remains in place even after its 
7. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG/BR-0216, REV. 2, RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE: PRODUCTION, STOHAGE, DISPOSAL 7 (2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/read 
ing-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0216/r2/br0216r2.pdf. 
8. Id. 
9. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 117. 
10. U.S. State by State Used Fuel and Payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund, NUCLEAH 
ENEHGY INST., http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/On-Site-Storage-of 
-Nuclear-Waste/US-State-by-State-Used-Fuel-and-Payments-to-the-Nu (last updated May 
2014). 
11. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-230, DOE NUCLEAR WASTE: 
BE'l"rER INFOHMATION NEEDED ON WASTE STORAGE AT DOE SITES AS A RESULT OF YUCCA 
MOUNTAIN SHUTDOWN 1-2, 29 (2011); Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste, U.S. Gov'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/disposal_of_highlevel_nuclear_ 
waste/issue_summary (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
12. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 115 (using the term "Achilles Heel" to de-
scribe the waste disposal problem, which has plagued the nuclear industry for sixty years). 
13. See id. at 115-16. 
14. See Richard B. Stewart & Jane B. Stewart, Solving the Spent Nuclear Fuel Im-
passe, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (indicating that there is a growing concern for 
safety over at-reactor SNF storage). 
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associated nuclear pow.er plant has been shut down and thus pre-
vents the land on which it sits from being used for other purpos-
15 es. 
This comment will analyze the SNF problem in the United 
States and offer recommendations for how to move forward. First, 
Part I will summarize the path that has led to this impasse. Part 
II offers recommended solutions on how the United States can 
develop a workable SNF solution that includes a permanent re-
pository, consolidated intermediate storage, and reprocessing. Fi-
nally, this comment will offer its conclusion that the United 
States should begin the process of establishing a permanent geo-
logic repository for SNF at a location other than Yucca Mountain, 
create a system of consolidated interim storage to temporarily 
house SNF, and establish a program to reprocess SNF. 
I. THE SNF PROBLEM 
The path that led to the current SNF situation is full of many 
political and legal complications. It is, however, critical to under-
standing the current condition of the SNF problem and is worth 
summarizing here. 
A. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
The nuclear fuel cycle is a term used to refer to "the series of 
industrial processes used to produce electricity from uranium in a 
nuclear reactor."16 Broken down into three major parts, the cycle 
consists first of a "front end," the mining and preparation of ura-
nium to be used as nuclear fuel; second, the fuel is used in a nu-
clear reactor to create electrical energy; and third, the "back end," 
when the SNF is removed from the reactor and stored for ulti-
d. 117 mate isposa . 
During the second part of the nuclear fuel cycle, when the ura-
nium is being used as fuel in an operating reactor, neutrons col-
lide with uranium atoms resulting in fission-the splitting of the 
15. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTUHE, REPOHT TO THE SECHETARY OF 
ENERGY 9, 35 (2012) (explaining that SNF left on-site at shutdown power plants prevents 
the land from other economically beneficial uses). 
16. Id. at 9. 
17. Id. 
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uranium atoms. 18 The splitting of a uranium atom creates fission 
fragments, each about half the mass of the original atom, ~nd a 
number of additional neutrons. 19 These neutrons will go on to col-
lide with other uranium atoms, continuing the chain reaction.20 
The splitting of uranium atoms into fission fragments creates ki-
netic energy, which is in turn converted to heat and then electric-
ity. 21 The fission fragments created in the nuclear reaction are 
highly radioactive, and they remain in the SNF after it is re-
moved from the reactor. 22 
When the nuclear fuel can no longer efficiently produce energy, 
it is removed from the reactor.23 At the point of initial removal 
from the reactor, the SNF has a high temperature and emits 
large amounts of radiation; it is therefore considered a High-
Level Waste ("HLW").21 Immediately after coming out of the reac-
tor, SNF is kept in "wet storage" by submerging it in deep, water-
filled pools. 25 The SNF is typically kept in these pools for around 
five years in order to keep it cool and help dissipate the radiation 
that it emits. 26 After the SNF has cooled down sufficiently in wet 
storage, it can be safely moved to "dry storage."21 Dry storage is 
typically accomplished by placing the SNF inside casks comprised 
of an inner steel container surrounded by an outer concrete and 
steel container.28 The SNF inside the dry casks can still have rela-
tively high temperatures, but is cooled through natural circula-
tion of air. 29 
18. See How a Nuclear Reactor Makes Electricity, WOHLD NUCLEAH Ass'N, http://www. 
world-nucloar.org/nuclear-basics/how-does-a-nuclear-reactor-make-electricity-/ (last visit-
ed Apr. 3, 2015); Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy, WOHLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http: 
//www. world-nuclear .org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Introduction/Physics-of-N uclear-Energy/ 
(last updated Sept. 2014). 
19. Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy, supra note 18. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. 
22. See id.; BLUE H!IlBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAH FUTURE, supra note 15, at 11. 
23. BLUI~ RmBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAH FUTUHE, supra note 15, at 10. 
24. See id. at 10-11; High-Level Waste, U.S. NUCLEAH REGULATOHY COMM'N, http: 
//www.nrc.gov/waste/high-level-waste.html (last updated Apr. 6, 2012) (identifying SNF as 
one form of HLW). 
25. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAH FUTUHE, supra note 15, at 11. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See id. 
29. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 27. 
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B. Early SNF Pol.icy 
Civilian nuclear power was first developed commercially in the 
United States in the 1950s with the understanding that the re-
sulting SNF would be reprocessed for our nation's nuclear weap-
ons program.30 Under this early policy, SNF was only to be stored 
on site at nuclear power plants temporarily until it would be 
transported to reprocessing facilities so that the unused uranium 
and plutonium in the SNF could be separated and reused. 31 How-
ever, even after the reprocessing of SNF, there is still a portion of 
the radioactive waste that requires disposal.32 So, in 1957 the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences ("NAS") determined that underground 
burial would be the best solution for HLW disposal. 33 Further-
more, in the 1970s, concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation 
effectively ended the United States' policy of commercial SNF re-
processing.:11 In 1978, with reprocessing of SNF no longer consid-
ered an option, an Interagency Review Group recommended that 
the federal government become responsible for the disposal of 
commercial SNF and that it be disposed in a geologic repository. 35 
C. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
Subsequent to shifting from a policy that included SNF repro-
cessing to one that was solely focused on geologic burial, Congress 
passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA"). 3G The 
NWPA established that the federal government would take cus-
tody of commercial SNF and required the DOE to recommend at 
least five sites for a potential location for a geologic repository for 
its indefinite burial.37 The NWPA also authorized the develop-
ment of "monitored retrievable storage" facilities, which would act 
as centralized locations for the interim storage of SNF while a re-
30. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 117-18; Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, 
at 8-9. 
31. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 118. 
32. Id. at 140. 
83. Debra J. Carfora, Building a Sustainable Energy Future: Offering a Solution to the 
Nuclear Waste Disposal Problem Through Reprocessing and the Rebirth of Yucca Moun-
tain, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 143, 153 (2012). 
34. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9. 
35. Carfora, supra note 83, at 153; Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 119. 
36. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2012). 
37. Carfora, supra note 33, at 154. 
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pository was being constructed.38 Until a geologic repository or 
centralized interim storage was developed, electric utilities were 
to continue storing their SNF on-site at nuclear power plants.:39 
The NWP A also established the Nuclear Waste Fund ("NWF') 
to finance the disposal of SNF.·10 In exchange for the federal gov-
ernment's eventual assumption of custody of the United States' 
commercial SNF, nuclear utilities were required to make annual 
contributions to the NWF, which would pay for the eventual dis-
posal of the SNF.41 The Standard Contracts the utilities entered 
into with the DOE stated that the DOE would begin to dispose of 
the SNF no later than January 31, 1998.42 
The DOE encountered significant political resistance from local 
communities in its efforts to choose locations for a geologic reposi-
tory.and consolidated interim storage facilities. 43 Therefore, in or-
der to speed up the process of establishing those locations, Con-
gress amended the NWPA in 1987.44 These amendments to the 
NWPA established that the sole candidate for a SNF geologic re-
pository in the United States would be located at Yucca Mountain 
in Nevada.'15 Additionally, in an effort to ensure that a repository 
would actually be established, the 1987 NWPA amendments also 
prohibited the DOE from constructing any consolidated interim 
storage facility for commercial SNF until a license has been 
granted for the geologic repository. 46 
D. Yucca Mountain 
Yucca Mountain, located about ninety miles northwest of Las 
Vegas, Nevada, is the only legally possible site for a commercial 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 10161; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 10151; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120. 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(B); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
43. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9. 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(b); see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9. 
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a); Carfora, supra note 33, at 155. 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10165(b), 10168(d)(l); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120; 
Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 67 (explaining that the restrictions that the 1987 
amendments to the NWPA placed on consolidated interim storage facilities were based on 
a concern that their establishment would undermine the development of a geologic reposi· 
tory). 
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SNF repository in the United States.'17 The site, which is owned by 
the federal government, has been determined by the DOE to be a 
"'stable geologic environment,' unlikely to be disturbed by seismic 
or volcanic forces." 18 
Since the passage of the NWPA, Yucca Mountain has been ex-
tensively studied and prepared to house the United States' SNF 
repository. 19 The DOE has assessed Yucca Mountain as a "promis-
ing site for a geologic repository."50 So, in 2002, after spending 
$7.1 billion studying the suitability of Yucca Mountain, President 
Bush signed the Yucca Mountain Development Act (YMDA) into 
law, which began the licensing process for Yucca Mountain as a 
SNF geologic repository.51 
The State of Nevada has been opposed to the establishment of 
a SNF repository at Yucca Mountain since passage of the NWPA 
Amendments in 1987.52 In addition to submitting a formal "Notice 
of Disapproval" to Congress before the passage of the YMDA,53 the 
State of Nevada, Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Nu-
clear Energy Institute filed thirteen lawsuits in an attempt to 
prevent the repository from moving forward. 51 Their efforts did 
not completely derail Yucca Mountain, but did result in consider-
able delay. In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia held that, in evaluating radiation protection, 
a 1,000,000-year safety standard should have been used-based 
on NAS findings-instead of the 10,000-year safety standard that 
47. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 121-22. This includes the excavation of "a five mile tunnel through the 
mountain to function as an Exploratory Study Facility." Id. at 122. 
50. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP''l' OF ENERGY, DOE/RW-
0508, VIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, OVERVIEW 2 (1998). 
51. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 157; Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 124. 
52. See Joseph A. Cohen, What to Do with America's Nuclear Defense Waste: The Han-
ford Effect, 6 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 8-9 (2014) (stating that the 
1987 NWPA, dubbed the "Screw Nevada bill," has seen significant local resistance); Stew-
art & Stewart, supra note 14, at 9 (noting Nevada's resistance to the Yucca Mountain pro-
ject). 
53. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 123. 
54. Carfora, supra note 33, at 157. 
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was used. 55 Therefore, four additional years of research were re-
quired by the Environmental Protection Agency to comply with 
the court's ruling.56 
In 2008, after twenty years and $12 billion to establish Yucca 
Mountain as the repository location, the DOE submitted a licens-
ing application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") to 
begin the three-year licensing process.57 But, in 2009, with the 
start of the Obama administration, came a shift in policy against 
Yucca Mountain. 58 First, President Obama requested that Con-
gress discontinue funding the Yucca Mountain project in an at-
tempt to stop its progress. 59 The next year, in 2010, the DOE filed 
a motion to withdraw the Yucca Mountain licensing application 
with prejudice, meaning that the application could never be re-
filed.60 Although the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
denied the DOE's petition to withdraw the Yucca Mountain appli-
cation,61 the licensing proceeding was nonetheless suspended. 62 
States and municipalities that are home to nuclear power plants 
then brought legal action before the NRC and D.C. Circuit to 
force the NRC to continue with the licensing procedure.63 As a re-
sult, in August 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued mandamus requiring 
the NRC to process the Yucca Mountain licensing application.6'1 
The NRC has since resumed licensing proceedings.65 
E. Recent Litigation 
In addition to political and legal issues surrounding the estab-
lishment of a geologic repository for SNF, there has also been re-
55. See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267, 1273 (D.C. 
Cir. 20°'1). 
56. Carfora, supra note 33, at 158. 
57. Cohen, supra note 52, at 9. 
58. See id. According to Cohen, the policy shift against Yucca Mountain was a political 
decision by President Obama, influenced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D· 
Nevada) and tied to a campaign promise Obama made in the 2008 presidential election. 
Id. at 9-10. 
59. Carfora, supra note 33, at 159. 
60. Id.; In re U.S. Dep't of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 615-
16, 2010 WL 9105479 at *5 (N.R.C. 2010). 
Gl. In re U.S. Dep't of Energy, 71 N.R.C. at 629. 
G2. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 13. 
G3. Carfora, supra note 33, at 159. 
64. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
65. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 14. 
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cent litigation regarding the NWF and licensing and relicensing 
of commercial nuclear power plants. 
In November 2013, the D.C. Circuit held that "[b]ecause the 
Secretary [of Energy] is apparently unable to conduct a legally 
adequate fee assessment, the Secretary is ordered to submit to 
Congress a proposal to change the fee to zero."66 This has effec-
tively stopped the DOE from collecting money for the NWF.67 
The uncertainty surrounding the Yucca Mountain SNF reposi-
tory has also led to problems with the licensing of nuclear power 
plants. After multiple states filed suit regarding the licensing of 
nuclear power plants, the D.C. Circuit suspended the licensing 
process because the NRC had not adequately addressed the pos-
sibility of leaks or fires occurring in SNF storage pools, nor had it 
considered the possibility that a geologic repository might never 
be built.68 However, in September 2014, the NRC issued a new 
"Waste Confidence Rule" which addressed the court's concerns.69 
This has led the NRC to resume issuing licenses for commercial 
nuclear power plants.70 However, despite the NRC's new Waste 
Confidence Rule, recent petitions have been filed to again stop 
the licensing and relicensing of nuclear power plants. 71 With this 
continued litigation, it appears that there will not be any resolu-
tion to the SNF problem soon. 
66. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 736 F.3d 517, 521 
(D.C. Cir. 2013). 
67. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 4 n.3. 
68. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 681 F.3d 471, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
69. Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (to 
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51); see also Sonal Patel, NRC Issues Final Rule to Replace 
Waste Confidence Decision, Ends Licensing Suspension, POWER (Aug. 26, 2014), http:// 
www.powermag.com/nrc-issues-final-rule-to-replace-waste-confidence-decision-ends-licens 
ing-suspension/. This new waste confidence rule concludes that SNF can be safely stored 
on-site at nuclear power plants indefinitely. Id. 
70. Nancy Slater-Thompson, NRC Resumes License Renewals for Nuclear Power 
Plants, PENNENERGY (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/20 
14/10/nrc-resumes-license-renewals-for-nuclear-power-plants.html. 
71. See Danielle Killey, Tribe Appeals NRC's Waste Storage Riile30, HEPUilLICAN 
EAGLE (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.republican-eagle.com/content/tribe-appeals-
nrcs-waste-storage-rule30; Activists File Petition to Stop Licensing of U.S. Nuclear Plants, 
LONGVIEW NEWS-JOURNAL (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.news-journal.com/news/nation/ac 
tivists-file-petition-to-stop-licensing-ofu-s-nuclear-plants/ article_ 42987 d 7f-f0e4-54c6-8c07 -
d3a90beba077.html. 
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F. Current SNF Strategy 
While attempting to take Yucca Mountain off the table as the 
location for a permanent geologic repository for SNF, President 
Obama, in January 2010, had the DOE establish a Blue Ribbon 
Commission to develop a solution to the SNF disposal problem. 72 
In January 2012, the Blue Ribbon Commission issued its final re-
port, which included recommendations for SNF disposal. 73 Alt-
hough the Blue Ribbon Commission's report highlighted the need 
for a geologic repository, it did not address the suitability of Yuc-
ca Mountain as a location for that repository or the controversy 
over the DOE attempting to withdraw the Yucca Mountain licens-
ing application.74 
In response to the Blue Ribbon Commission's report, in Janu-
ary 2013, the DOE published the administration's Strategy for 
the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-
Level Radioactive Waste. 75 This document essentially parallels 
the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendations, and it also fails 
to provide a specific plan for how the location of a permanent re-
pository will be determined. 76 In fact, the DOE's strategy does not 
mention Yucca Mountain at all, not even in an historical con-
text.77 
However, this recent anti-Yucca Mountain policy shift is in di-
rect conflict with the existing statutory scheme created by the 
NWP A. 78 As a result, there is currently no real plan to solve the 
SNF problem. Serious work still needs to be done in order to de-
velop a workable solution. Applying the following recommenda-
tions would be a step in that direction. 
72. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 116; see also Carfora, supra note 33, at 159 (de-
scribing how the Blue Ribbon Commission was part of the President's plan to terminate 
the Yucca Mountain project). 
73. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at vii; Cohen, 
supra note 52, at 10-11. 
74. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at vii-viii. 
75. U.S. DIW'T OF ENERGY, STRATEGY FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF USED 
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 1 (2013) [hereinafter DOE 
STRATEGY], available at http://www.energy.gov/downloads/strategy-management-and-
disposal-used-nuclear-fuel-and-high-level-radioactive-waste; Cohen, supra note 52, at 11-
12. 
76. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 12. 
77. See DOE STHATEGY, supra note 75. 
78. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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II. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
Despite ·the systemic problems with the United States' SNF 
policy, there are steps that can and should be taken in order to 
provide a solution. Specifically, the United States should immedi-
ately begin the process of developing one or more consolidated in-
terim storage facilities in addition to a geologic repository in a lo-
cation other than Yucca Mountain. Additionally, the United 
States should initiate a commercial SNF reprocessing program in 
order to reduce the volume of waste that will require permanent 
disposal. 
A. Permanent Geologic Repository and Consolidated Interim 
Storage 
Any solution to the SNF disposal problem must include estab-
lishing a physical location for our country's SNF to reside. As dis-
cussed below, although reprocessing of SNF can reduce the vol-
ume of waste to be disposed of, portions of the SNF cannot be 
recycled and must be disposed in some other way. 79 And, although 
some creative SNF disposal solutions have been proposed, be-
cause of safety concerns or international treaties, the only realis-
tic option is permanent disposal in an underground repository.80 
Regardless of how the Yucca Mountain situation is resolved, the 
United States should immediately start to consider additional re-
pository locations. In the meantime, due to the significant 
amount of time required to establish a geologic repository, one or 
more intermediate storage facilities should be established for 
temporary storage of our country's commercial SNF.81 
79. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140 ("[R]eprocessing does not eliminate the dis-
posal issue. Reprocessing still generates a significant volume of highly radioactive 
waste."). 
80. Carfora, supra note 33, at 163-64. Some of the locations that have been considered 
for SNF disposal include outer space, ocean bottom, and within the polar ice. Id. at 163. 
Unfortunately, launching SNF into space is considered too dangerous because of the risk 
of nuclear contaminated debris being sprinkled across the globe in the event of a rocket 
malfunction. Id. Similarly, international agreements ban the disposal of SNF at sea or 
within polar ice sheets. Id. at 163-64. 
81. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTUHE, supra note 15, at 35 ("The 
Commission concludes that there are several compelling reasons to move as quickly as 
possible to develop safe, consolidated storage capacity on a regional or national basis."). 
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1. Geologic Repository 
As part of the solution to the SNF problem, the United States 
should continue to move towards establishing geologic reposito-
ries for the eventual permanent disposal of SNF. This plan should 
include, but not be completely dependent on, Yucca Mountain for 
a repository location. 
SNF requires disposal because it contains a large concentration 
of unstable isotopes that undergo radioactive decay and in doing 
so emit high levels of radiation. 82 Exposure to the radiation from 
SNF can be dangerous to humans because the radiation has the 
ability to alter the molecular structure of tissue. 83 The harm that 
results from radiation exposure can lead to cancer, genetic de-
fects, and death. 81 Because of the extremely long half-lives of 
some of the radioactive isotopes in SNF, it can remain hazardous 
for thousands of years. 85 Therefore, as the Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion stated in its report, "deep geological disposal is the most 
promising and accepted method currently available for safely iso-
lating [SNF] and high-level radioactive wastes from the environ-
ment for very long periods of time."86 
The development of a repository at Yucca Mountain is clearly 
at an impasse.87 Furthermore, the Obama administration has no 
intention of going forward with the Yucca Mountain project. 88 
However, completely abandoning Yucca Mountain would be a 
mistake.89 
Yucca Mountain is a prime location to develop an SNF reposi-
tory.no As stated to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works: 
82. BLUE H!IlBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAH FUTURE, supra note 15, at 12. 
8a. Id. 
84. Id. at 14. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 29. 
87. See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text. 
88. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 159, 162 (discussing how, under the Obama admin-
istration, the Department of Energy attempted to withdraw the licensing application for 
Yucca Mountain, and the Blue Ribbon Commission made no recommendations for Yucca 
Mountain). 
89. Id. at 168 ("[P]olicymakers should move forward with Yucca Mountain."). 
90. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 109th Cong., YUCCA MOUNTAIN: THE 
MOST STUDIED HEAL ESTATE ON THE PLANET 23 (2006). 
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More is known about Yucca Mountain than any other parcel of real 
estate on the planet .... It has been confirmed in the laboratory, re-
viewed by independent experts, and validated against information 
from analogous sites around the world .... There is certain\f; no rea-
son in science not to move forward directly with this project. 
1 
1277 
This has been determined after investing more than three dec-
ades and billions of dollars into researching Yucca Mountain. 92 
However, the Obama administration has decided to put the 
brakes on Yucca Mountain, not because of any technical or safety 
issues, but rather solely for policy reasons. 93 But despite the ad-
ministration's policy shift against Yucca Mountain, the amount of 
research, time, and money that has already been invested into 
developing the repository makes the abandonment of Yucca 
Mountain the wrong decision.9·1 Otherwise, the last three decades 
of SNF policy will have "left the country with no waste disposal 
solution in sight and taxpayers with a $10 billion bill for a tunnel 
in the middle of the desert that leads nowhere."95 
Deciding to keep Yucca Mountain as part of the United States' 
SNF plan is easier said than done. The "not-in-my-backyard" poli-
tics that have all but terminated Yucca Mountain are not likely to 
go away. 96 However, it is possible that a compromise could be 
made to prevent a complete loss of the investment that the Unit-
ed States taxpayers have made in Yucca Mountain. Even if it is 
not used as a repository for SNF, Yucca Mountain could still po-
tentially be developed as a repository for low-level radioactive 
waste.97 The United States should keep Yucca Mountain as part 
of the solution to the SNF problem, even if it is not as a perma-
nent SNF repository. 
91. Id. 
92. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-229, COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE: 
EFFECTS OF A TERMINA'rION OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY PROGRAM AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 10 (2011) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE]. 
93. Id. at 11. 
94. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 167-68. 
95. Id. at 166. 
96. See id. at 150 (describing how "not-in-my-backyard" politics have prevented Yucca 
Mountain from coming to fruition); see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 144 (rec-
ommending that the current Yucca Mountain project be set aside due to local political op-
position). 
97. Aaron Szabo, Reprocessing: 'The Future of Nuclear Waste, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & 
ENVTL. L. 231, 234, 241 (2010). 
1278 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1265 
Regardless of whether Yucca Mountain ever actually becomes a 
permanent SNF repository, policymakers should immediately 
begin to consider other locations for housing another repository.98 
The amount of SNF that is currently being stored on-site at nu-
clear power plants across the country already exceeds 70,000 
metric tons, the legal capacity that Yucca Mountain could hold.99 
Therefore, even if Yucca Mountain were to become a repository 
for SNF, it would not have the capacity to hold all of our current 
SNF, not to mention the additional SNF that will be generated in 
the future.ioo This means, "under current law, the United States 
will need to find a new repository site even if Yucca Mountain 
were to go forward."ioi 
The search for a new repository site must begin now because, 
as history has shown, the process of establishing an SNF reposi-
tory is long and complicated. The United States' quest to estab-
lish a repository at Yucca Mountain has taken over thirty years 
and $15 billion. 102 And after that significant investment, the fu-
ture of Yucca Mountain is still uncertain. 
In conclusion, the plan for the United States' commercial SNF 
must incorporate at least one geologic repository. That plan 
should include, but not be completely dependent on, Yucca Moun-
tain as a repository site. Therefore, if Yucca Mountain never ma-
terializes-a distinct possibility-there will still be some other lo-
cation where SNF can be safely disposed of. 
2. Consolidated Interim Storage 
Because there is no indication that a permanent geological re-
pository for SNF will be established any time soon, ioa in the mean-
98. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 8. 
99. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 143. 
100. Id. at 144 ("The current stockpile of commercial and defense nuclear waste des-
tined for Yucca Mountain already exceeds [the capacity of Yucca Mountain], and the 
amount of waste continues to increase."). 
101. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 48. 
102. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 92, at 10. 
103. The Government Accountability Office has estimated that even if the licensin.g 
process for Yucca Mountain were to resume, it would still take until at least 2027 before it 
would be open as a repository. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTADILITY OFI•'ICE, GA0-12-797, SPEN'l' 
NUCLEAH FUEL: ACCUMULATING QUANTITIES AT COMMEHCIAL REACTOHS PRESEN;t' 
STOHAGE AND OTHER CHALLENGES 23 (2012). It has also been estimated that a new reposi-
tory could take up to forty years to develop. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 145. 
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time, the United States should establish one or more intermedi-
ate storage facilities to assume custody of the SNF that is build-
ing up at nuclear power plants across the country. There are cur-
rently 72,000 metric tons of SNF in storage at seventy-five sites 
in thirty-three states. 10·1 This SNF is expected to continue to ac-
cumulate at a rate of 2200 metric tons per year. 105 Assuming that 
the United States does not license any new commercial nuclear 
power plants, 106 in the year 2067, after the last currently operat-
ing reactor shuts down, the amount of SNF needing to be dis-
posed of will be 139,000 metric tons.107 
Of the seventy-five sites in the United States currently holding 
SNF, ten of them are storing "stranded SNF."108 This means that 
the reactor itself is shut down and has either been removed or is 
currently being removed. 109 rrhe stranded SNF presents unique 
challenges due to the lack of an operating reactor on site. 
First, because there is no longer an operational nuclear power 
plant, there are higher costs associated with stranded SNF than 
with SNF kept at an active plant. 110 Specifically, because operat-
ing nuclear power plants already maintain robust systems for se-
curity and maintenance there are relatively low incremental costs 
for maintaining the SNF on site. m Conversely, sites keeping 
stranded SNF must absorb all the security and maintenance costs 
104. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILI'l'Y OFFICE, GA0-15-141, SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
MANAGEMENT: OUTREACH NEEDED TO HELP GAIN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR FEDERAL 
AC'l'IVITIES THAT ADDRESS LIABILITY 1 (2014) [hereinafter SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
MANAGEMENT]. 
105. Id. at 11. 
106. This is probably a bad assumption considering the United States currently gets 
about twenty percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Nuclear Explained, supra note 
3. 
107. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 14. 
108. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON MI.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35-36 (noting 
that as of January 2012 ten plants-Big Rock Point (Michigan), Haddam Neck (Connecti-
cut), Hamboldt Bay (California), LaCrosse (Wisconsin), Maine Yankee (Maine), Rancho 
Seco (California), Trojan (Oregon), Yankee Rowe (Massachusetts), Zion 1 & 2 (Illinois), 
and Fort St. Vrain (Colorado)-all contain stranded SNF. Additionally, Vermont Yankee 
shut down in December 2014, creating the newest stranded SNF. See Zoe Schlanger, Ver-
mont Yanhee Nuclear Power Plant Just Shut Down; U.S. Still Has No System for Dispos-
ing of Nuclear Waste, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/vermont-
yankee-nuclear-plant-just-shut-down-us-still-has-no-system-disposing-295775. 
109. BLUE RnmoN COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
llO. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 57. 
111. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
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for the singular purpose of holding SNF. 112 '!'his can be particular-
ly burdensome considering the fact that the site is no longer gen-
erating any revenue from electricity production to offset those 
costs. 113 
'I'he other challenge unique to stranded SNF is that it prevents 
the site from being used for some other purpose. 111 'I'he local com-
munity is forced to deal with the fact that the stranded SNF is 
there and the land that it sits on cannot be put to some more pro-
ductive use. 115 This can be especially aggravating for the commu-
nity because they never consented to the SNF being stored indef-
initely nor do they receive any benefits for hosting this 
material. 116 
All SNF, but stranded SNF in particular, would be much better 
suited if it were moved from the several sites where it is currently 
located to one or more consolidated interim storage facilities 
while a geologic repository is being constructed. 117 Consolidated 
interim storage of SNF also has the support of the DOE and the 
Blue Ribbon Commission. 118 '!'here are major benefits of moving 
the commercial SNF to a consolidated interim storage facility. In-
terim storage facilities are considered safer and more cost effec-
tive than on-site storage and would allow the DOE to meet its ob-
ligation of taking custody of the commercial SNF sooner than it 
would if it had to wait for a permanent geologic repository. 119 
'I'he federal government contends that the current system of 
storing SNF on site at commercial nuclear power plants is safe. 120 
In fact, in September 2014, the NRC issued a new rule adopting 
112. See id. ("[T]he operation and maintenance costs for spent fuel storage at shutdown 
sites range from $4.5 million to $8 million per year, compared to an incremental $1 million 
per year or less when the reactor is still in operation."). 
113. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 57. 
114. BLUE RIIlBON COMM'N ON ML'S NUCLEAR FUTUHE, supra note 15, at 35. 
115. Id. 
116. See id. (discussing the impact of spent fuel on communities in the area). 
117. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 144 (advocating the simultaneous develop-
ment of "both centralized interim storage and permanent geological disposal facilities"); 
see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 59 ("[T]he considerations invoked by BRC 
and the Hamal Report also justify development of consolidated storage facilities for SNF 
that now resides at reactor sites."). 
118. BLUE RmBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAH FUTUHE, supra note 15, at 35; DOE 
STHATEGY, supra note 75, at 2. 
119. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 138. 
120. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 10-11. 
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the findings from a generic environmental impact statement 
("GEIS"). 121 Th\:) GEIS evaluated the safety of storing SNF on site 
at nuclear power plants over three separate timeframes: short-
term (sixty years beyond licensed life of the reactor), long-term 
(100 years beyond the licensed life of the reactor), and indefinite 
storage (assuming no geologic repository ever becomes availa-
ble).122 The GEIS concluded that commercial SNF can be safely 
stored at reactor sites indefinitely. 123 However, despite the gov-
ernment's confidence that SNF can be safely stored on-site at 
power plants, the Fukushima incident in 2011 has led some to 
question how safe that policy actually is. 121 Multiple consolidated 
interim storage facilities for SNF could help protect the United 
States against a Fukushima-like disaster. 125 By having consoli-
dated interim storage facilities that include wet storage, SNF 
could be moved from pools at nuclear power plant sites in the 
event of an emergency requiring those pools to be cleared. 126 
Besides safety concerns, proponents of consolidated interim 
storage for commercial SNF argue that those facilities can 
"achieve significant scale economies in operating and maintaining 
security, yielding very significant operating cost savings relative 
to the costs of providing security for the numerous storage facili-
ties at nuclear power plants dispersed across the country."127 The-
se cost savings will be most significant for the country's stranded 
SNF, where the cost for storage ranges from $4.5 million to $8 
million per year. 128 According to the Blue Ribbon Commission, the 
121. Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238 (Sept. 19, 2014) (to 
be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
122. U.S. NUCLEAR RTCGULATORY COMM'N, NUREG·2157, GENERIC ENVIRONMTCNTAL 
lMPAC'l' STATEMENT FOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, at xxx fig.ES-1 
(2014) [hereinafter GEIS], available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1419/ML14196A 
105.pdf. 
123. Patel, supra note 69. See generally GEIS, supra note 122, at xlvii-xlviii tbl.ES-3 
(indicating that even with indefinite at-reactor storage of commercial SNF, environmental 
impacts would be generally small for all of the study's resource areas). 
124. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 136; see also Stewart & Stewart, supra note 
14, at 29. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex was struck by an earthquake 
and tsunami that caused significant damage. Id. at 24. The most serious problems at Fu-
kushima involved the SNF located in cooling pools that experienced cooling system fail-
ures due to the loss of electrical power. Id. at 24-25. This dangerous condition can lead to 
a release of radiation. Id. 
125. IlLUE RmllON COMM'N ON Mv!.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 37-38. 
126. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 49. 
127. Id. at 52. 
128. BLUE RmBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 35. 
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savings associated with moving the stranded SNF to a consoli-
dated interim storage facility would be enough to pay for that fa. 
cility. 129 
Establishing one or more consolidated interim storage facilities 
would also allow the federal government to begin meeting its 
waste acceptance obligations sooner than it otherwise would if it 
waited for a geologic repository. 130 Pursuant to the NWPA, the 
DOE entered into Standard Contracts with utilities for the re-
moval of SNF from their reactor sites starting in 1998. 131 In re-
turn for the federal government taking custody of the SNF, the 
utilities have made annual contributions to the NWF, which 
would finance the eventual disposal of the SNF.132 The fee that 
the utilities pay was initially set at 1 mill (0.1 cents) per kilowatt. 
hour of nuclear electricity produced.133 The NWF currently has an 
unspent balance of $27 billion. 134 
However, due to the delays in establishing a geologic repository 
at Yucca Mountain, the federal government has not yet taken 
custody of any commercial SNF. 135 As of March 2014, over ninety 
lawsuits have been filed against the DOE for this breach of con-
tract.136 By 2012, the federal government had paid $2 billion in 
damages as a result of these lawsuits. 137 The DOE estimates that 
its future liability will be $21.4 billion through 2071.138 
Congressional budget rules have resulted in the NWF money 
becoming essentially inaccessible. 139 As a result, the damages that 
the federal government has been paying to the utilities for its 
breach of contract do not come from the NWF; instead, they come 
from the federal Judgment Fund. 110 "Because payments from the 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 36 ("Developing consolidated storage capacity would enable the U.S. 
government to begin fulfilling its legal obligations ... with respect to the acceptance and 
removal of SNF from commercial reactor sites."). 
131. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120-21; see supra Part I.C. 
132. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 120-21; see supra Part I.C. 
133. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON NvI.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 70. 
134. Id. at 71. 
135. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 121. 
136. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 2. 
137. Schlanger, supra note 108. 
138. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT, supra note 104, at 2. 
139. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 72. 
140. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 102. 
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Judgment Fund come out of the general federal Treasury, rather 
than the NWF, taxpayers are ultimately paying for the cost of 
SNF storage" instead of the nuclear utility ratepayers who have, 
by extension, been paying into the NWF. 111 By establishing consol-
idated interim storage facilities, taxpayers will finally be off the 
hook for the federal government's breach of contract.142 
Opponents of establishing consolidated interim storage facili-
ties argue that there will be too much political opposition from lo-
cal communities where the federal government attempts to estab-
lish such facilities. 143 Another downside to interim storage is that 
the SNF would often have to be transported twice-from the nu-
clear power plant to the interim storage facility and then from the 
interim storage facility to an eventual geologic repository-
adding unneeded additional risk. 141 Additionally, it is estimated 
that an interim storage facility for SNF would take nineteen 
years to develop at a cost ranging from $23 billion to $81 billion.).15 
The significant time associated with establishing a system of 
consolidated interim storage is precisely why the United States 
should act now to implement such a system as part of the solution 
to the SNF problem. Had the NWPA not put all its eggs in the 
Yucca Mountain basket, but rather allowed an SNF disposal sys-
tem that included interim storage, the United States might not be 
facing this problem today. Therefore, "[f]rom the viewpoint of 
SNF safety and costs, it would be desirable to include SNF from 
operating reactors as well as from decommissioned reactors in 
consolidated storage sooner rather than later."146 
3. Choosing Intermediate Storage and Repository Locations 
In order to implement a plan for SNF that includes a repository 
at a non-Yucca Mountain location and consolidated interim stor-
age, the NWPA will have to be repealed or amended. The NWPA, 
as amended in 1987, prohibits the construction of an interim 
141. Id. at 20, 102. 
142. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 36-37. 
143. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 138. 
144. Id. 
145. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-11-731T, NUCLEAR WASTE: DISPOSAL 
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM YUCCA MOUNTAIN 12 (2011). 
146. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 59-60. 
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storage facility until a geological repository is licensed. 147 Addi-
tionally,. by law, Yucca Mountain is the only site that can be con-
sidered for a geologic repository. 118 Therefore, Congress must 
amend or repeal the NWPA to clear the way for the implementa-
tion of a workable SNF plan that includes developing a non-Yucca 
Mountain geologic repository and a consolidated interim storage 
f ·1·t ug ac1 i y. 
In changing the NWPA to restructure the United States' ap-
proach to managing SNF, policymakers should adopt a consent-
based approach to finding locations for a new geologic repository 
and one or more consolidated interim storage facilities. 150 Yucca 
Mountain has not worked as a geologic repository site because the 
project has been driven solely by politicians in Washington, D.C., 
and has not had the support of the local community. 151 Given this 
opposition, "[t]he federal government must accordingly abandon 
the 'top-down' prescriptions embraced in NWPA and its 1987 
amendments, and the dysfunctional approach to their implemen-
tation."152 It is a positive sign that the Blue Ribbon Commission 
and the DOE both support a consent-based approach for deter-
mining future SNF storage and repository locations. 153 
In using a consent-based approach to establish future SNF 
storage and repository sites, the federal government should tie 
economic incentives to localities that are willing to host a consoli-
dated interim storage facility or geologic repository. 151 A vigorous 
incentive package is also something that the Blue Ribbon Com-
mission identified as necessary in finding suitable locations for 
SNF disposal. 155 Specifically, the United States' SNF plan should 
147. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, sec. 5021, § 
148(d)(l), 101 Stat. 1330-227, 1330-236 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 10168 (2012)). 
148. Sec. 5011, §160, 101 Stat. 227, 228. 
149. See Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 146-47. 
150. See id. at 145. 
151. See, e.g., id. at 123-24 (describing how Nevada submitted a formal Notice of Dis-
approval in response to President Bush's approval of the Yucca Mountain repository and 
subsequently filed multiple lawsuits after Congress and the President overrode Nevada's 
disapproval). 
152. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 75. 
153. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 47; DOE 
STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 1-2. 
154. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 145. 
155. See BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 58-59. 
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tie storage and repository sites to research, development, and im-
plementation of SNF reprocessing. 156 
B. SNF Reprocessing 
Nuclear power technology has only existed for sixty years. 157 It 
would be extremely shortsighted to think that this technology will 
not continue to grow through advances in science and innovation. 
Therefore, the Unites States should not focus exclusively on a 
million-year solution to the SNF problem-burial in a geologic 
repository-when emerging technology, such as reprocessing, can 
be part of the answer. In order to solve its SNF problem, the 
United States should change its policy to include the reprocessing 
of SNF instead of solely focusing on permanent disposal. 
When a nuclear reactor reaches the point where it can no long-
er efficiently maintain its chain reaction to produce energy, it 
must be either decommissioned or refueled. 158 However, despite 
the fact that the SNF can no longer be used efficiently in the re-
actor, the SNF still contains a large quantity of uranium that can 
be used for fission. 159 Reprocessing is the process of removing the 
unused uranium from the SNF so that it can be reused as nuclear 
fuel in the future. 160 Even though reprocessing technology pres-
ently exists, 161 the United States currently has no commercial 
SNF reprocessing plants. 162 However, by implementing repro-
156. The Blue Ribbon Commission recommends that a potential host site be "co-located 
[with] research and demonstration facilities" but does not go far enough to explicitly en-
courage establishing a commercial SNF reprocessing program. Id. at 59. 
157. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 8-9. 
158. Decommissioning is the process of removing a nuclear power plant from service. 
See Bachgrounder on Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMM'N, available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/decommis 
sioning.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2014). As an alternative to decommissioning, nuclear 
power plants can be refueled by replacing the SNF with fresh fuel. See U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM'N, supra note 7, at 7. 
159. See Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, AREVA, http://www.areva.com/EN/opera 
tions-1092/areva-la-hague-recycling-used-fuel.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015) (stating that 
95% of the SNF removed from commercial nuclear reactors is uranium that can be recy-
cled). 
160. Fuel Reprocessing (Recycling), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www. 
nrc.Gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fuel-reprocessing-recycling.html (last updated Feb. 
18, 2015). 
161. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169 (stating that France, Japan, the United King-
dom, Russia, India, and China have all instituted SNF reprocessing programs). 
162. See Szabo, supra note 97, at 236 (stating that the only U.S. commercial SNF re-
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cessing as part of the solution to the SNF problem, the United 
States will be able to take advantage of increased ef(iciency in its 
nuclear power plants while at the same time minimizing the vol-
ume of SNF that will require permanent disposal. 163 
1. History of SNF Reprocessing in the United States 
SNF reprocessing technology has existed since the early 1940s 
when it was used by the United States for the development of nu-
clear weapons.164 Reprocessing continued for military purposes 
from the time of World War II until the Cold War, with the objec-
tive of creating greater numbers of nuclear weapons and develop-
ing more advanced nuclear weapon technology.165 The only com-
mercial SNF reprocessing plant in the United States operated in 
West Valley, New York from 1966 until 1976, when it shut down 
due to high costs and burdensome regulatory requirements.166 
In 1977, because of policy changes stemming from nuclear 
weapons proliferation concerns, President Carter indefinitely de-
ferred the commercial reprocessing of SNF. 167 However, in 1981, 
President Reagan lifted the ban on commercial SNF reprocessing, 
stating that the government had "failed in meeting its responsi-
bility to work with industry to develop an acceptable system for 
commercial waste disposal" and that he was "lifting the indefinite 
ban which previous administrations placed on commercial repro-
cessing activities in the United States."168 However, despite the 
processing plant operated in West Valley, New York, for six years starting in 1966). 
163. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70. 
164. Szabo, supra note 97, at 235. 
165. Id. at 235-36. 
166. Id. at 236; West Valley Demonstration Project Nuclear Timeline, U.S. DEP'T OF 
ENERGY W. VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, http://www.wv.doe.gov/Site_History.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
167. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON fill.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20. President 
Carter stated that "a serious risk is involved in the handling of nuclear fuels-the risk 
that component parts of this power process will be turned to providing explosives or atom-
ic weapons" and that the United States would "defer indefinitely the commercial repro-
cessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power programs." Nuclear 
Power Policy: Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Decisions 
Following a Review of U.S. Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 581, 582 (Apr. 7, 1977). 
168. Statement Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives on Nuclear Energy, PUB. 
PAPEHS 903, 904 (Oct. 8, 1981). 
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reversal of .the Carter policy by President Reagan, commercial re-
processing never resumed in the United States. 169 
As expressed by the DOE, the current policy of the United 
States under the Obama administration remains opposed to re-
processing. In January 2013, in response to the Blue Ribbon 
Commission's report, the DOE issued a strategy for the disposal 
of SNF. 110 The strategy appears on the surface to be open to repro-
cessing: "DOE will continue to conduct research on advanced fuel 
cycles to inform decisions on new technologies that may contrib-
ute to meeting the nation's future energy demands."111 However, 
by dismissing the need for the ability to retrieve SNF from a fu-
ture repository and stating that any future governmental organi-
zation charged with managing commercial SNF should not be au-
thorized to research, fund, or conduct SNF reprocessing, the DOE 
is effectively promoting an anti-reprocessing policy.172 
2. Potential Benefits of SNF Reprocessing 
Despite the current policy of not reprocessing its SNF, the 
United States should change that policy and implement SNF re-
processing as a part of the solution to the SNF disposal problem. 
Reprocessing SNF provides more efficient use of our natural re-
sources and minimizes the amount of SNF that must be disposed 
of in a geological repository .173 
If nuclear fuel is only used in a reactor once-meaning it is 
never reprocessed-then only about 5% of the available energy 
from the fuel is actually consumed. 111 Ninety-five percent of the 
SNF is unused uranium and 1% is plutonium.175 The uranium and 
plutonium-energy materials-can be physically separated from 
the 4% of the SNF that is waste. 176 Once separated from the 
waste, the energy materials can be recycled by turning them into 
169. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURI~, supra note 15, at 20. 
170. DOE STRATEGY, supra note 75, at 1. 
171. See id. at 8. 
172. See id. at 7, 10. 
173. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70. 
174. Id. at 169. 
175. Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, AREVA, http://www.areva.com/EN/operations-
1092/areva-la-hague-recycling-used-fuel.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
176. Id. 
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new fuels for nuclear power plants. 177 The waste can then be sta-
bilized ·through a vitrification process. 11" When the reprocessing is 
complete, the SNF needing to be disposed of in a permanent re-
pository has been reduced to one-fifth of its original volume. 179 So, 
in addition to using up to 30% less newly-mined uranium to refu-
el nuclear reactors, 180 the volume of waste needing disposal in a 
repository would also be significantly reduced. 181 
3. Arguments Against Reprocessing 
Despite the benefits of reprocessing SNF, opponents of repro-
cessing argue that the practice is not justified because of econom-
ics and the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. 182 
a. Expense of Reprocessing 
One of the main arguments against SNF reprocessing is that it 
is expensive. 18:i Accordingly, "the Congressional Budget Office 
concluded that reprocessing would cost at least $5 billion more 
than direct disposal over the life of a reprocessing plant, some 
25% greater in cost than direct disposal." 181 With current repro-
cessing technology, the cost of nuclear fuel would have to increase 
from its current value of $40/kilogram-Uranium (kgU) to $140/ 
kgU for reprocessing to be an economical alternative to dispos-
1 rn; a.
However, just because reprocessing is currently more expensive 




180. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140. 
181. See Carfora, supra note :J3, at 170; see also Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, 
supra note 175 ("Thanks to recycling and vitrification, the volume of highly radioactive 
waste is reduced fivefold."). 
182. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 171-72. 
183. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 141. 
18'1. !cl. (citing Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Disposing of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 
l lOth Cong. l (2007) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Of-
fice)). 
185. Szabo, supra note 97, at 247. "With the significant costs of building a reprocessing 
plant, the cost of reprocessing spent fuel would need to be significantly less than the cost 
of mining, fabricating and storing new nuclear fuel." !cl. at 246-47. 
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will always be the case. By "using efficiency-increasing practices, 
improving· reprocessing technologies, and the potential for de-
mand of uranium to increase, the cost per kgU of reprocessed fuel 
could significantly decrease the cost of reprocessing fuel, making 
it economical relative to the status quo."18G A logical conclusion 
can be drawn that more advanced SNF reprocessing technology 
will not be developed if reprocessing is not researched and used. 
If the United States continues to sit idly by, waiting for repro-
cessing technology to become more economically viable without 
actually developing it, that viability will never occur. 
Additionally, the economic analysis of reprocessing as opposed 
to direct disposal does not take into account the increased volume 
of radioactive material and additional real estate of repository 
space needed if reprocessing does not occur. 187 These are certainly 
valid concerns especially when considering how difficult it can be 
to actually establish repository space. Therefore, despite the eco-
nomic cost associated with SNF reprocessing, it should still be 
part of the United States' SNF strategy going forward. 
b. Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
Another major concern with SNF reprocessing, and the reason 
that commercial reprocessing was banned in the United States 
from 1977 to 1981, is the threat of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion.188 SNF reprocessing, by design, requires the separation of 
various elements contained within the SNF. 189 As a result of this 
186. Id. at 247. 
187. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 168-69 ("Hemoving the heated short-lived compo-
nents of the SNF could reduce the amount of space needed in the repository by eliminating 
the large gaps between casks."). See generally Costs of Reprocessing Versus Directly Dis-
posing of Spent Nuclear Fuel, llOth Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Peter R Orszag, Direc-
tor, Congressional Budget Office) ("Policymakers weighing the merits of reprocessing and 
direct disposal may have other concerns besides cost-such as extending U.S. uranium 
resources ... or lessening the demand for long-term storage space. Judging whether those 
goals justify the added costs of reprocessing is ultimately a decision for policymakers."). 
188. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND CONTAMINA'l'ED SITE CLEAN-UP, 
PROCESSES, TECHNOLOGIES AND INTEHNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 148 (William E. Lee, et al. 
eds., 2013) ("A de facto moratorium was placed on reprocessing of commercial spent nucle-
ar fuel in the US in 1977; this ban was lifted in 1981 .... "); Carfora, supra note 33, at 172 
("Many critics oppose reprocessing on grounds that it could load to nuclear weapons prolif-
eration."); BLUE RlllBON COMM'N ON AM.'S NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 20 (stating 
that the presidential directive deferring commercial reprocessing of SNF was in response 
to concerns of nuclear weapons proliferation). 
189. Recycling Used Fuel from Reactors, supra note 175. 
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process, pure plutonium is generated.190 Plutonium, because of the 
type of radiation that it emits, can be more easily used to create a 
nuclear weapon than other radioactive elements. 191 _ 
However, the fact that SNF reprocessing generates plutonium 
should not prevent commercial SNF reprocessing because com-
mercial SNF reprocessing does not produce the quality of pluto-
nium ideal for weapons. 192 Plutonium from commercial SNF re-
processing is considered "reactor-grade plutonium."193 SNF from 
commercial nuclear power plants has been used as fuel in the re-
actor for as long as economically feasible, which allows the power 
plant to get as much energy out of the fuel as possible. 191 This 
lengthy time in the reactor, however, also results in a high con-
centration of neutrons in the SNF. 195 These neutrons make the 
plutonium, from commercial SNF less explosive and therefore ill-
suited for making weapons. 196 
"Weapons-grade plutonium," which has fewer neutrons, would 
have to be extracted from SNF that has only been powering a 
commercial nuclear reactor for a short period of time. 197 Addition-
ally, reactors specifically designed to produce weapons-grade plu-
tonium are less expensive and less technologically complex than 
commercial power reactors. 198 Because weapons-grade plutonium 
is better suited for building nuclear weapons than reactor-grade 
plutonium, and it is easier to obtain from a plutonium reactor 
than from a commercial power reactor, it is unlikely that com-
mercial SNF reprocessing would result in nuclear weapons prolif-
eration.199 
Additionally, there are emerging SNF reprocessing technolo-
gies that do not result in plutonium being isolated from the rest 
of the SNF.200 These new reprocessing techniques keep uranium 
190. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 141. 
191. Id. at 141-42. 
192. Carfora, supra note 33, at 172. 
193. Id. 
194. See id. (indicating that it would be economically impractical to remove the fuel 





199. Id. at 173. 
200. Szabo, supra note 97, at 238; see also Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140. 
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and plutonium together but separate them from the waste.201 This 
type of reprocessing does not generate pure plutonium and, there-
fore, is less likely to result in weapons proliferation.202 Because 
the reprocessing of SNF from commercial power plants results in 
a low threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, reprocessing of 
commercial SNF should be implemented as part of the United 
States' plan for managing the SNF disposal problem. 
In summary, reprocessing SNF will result in greater efficiency 
in the nuclear fuel cycle and a lower volume of waste that will 
eventually need to be disposed in a repository.203 The risk of nu-
clear weapons proliferation and the high cost of reprocessing are 
both factors that should be considered when developing an SNF 
reprocessing scheme, but, as discussed above, they should not 
prevent the United States from using SNF reprocessing as part of 
its SNF solution. Therefore, in addition to storage and disposal, 
reprocessing of commercial SNF should become part of the United 
States' solution to the SNF problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States' system of disposing SNF is broken because 
it is nonexistent. 2o.i Progress can be made, however, if policymak-
ers implement these recommendations: (1) begin the process of 
establishing a permanent geologic repository at a location other 
than Yucca Mountain, while at the same time working to keep 
Yucca Mountain as a potential repository site; (2) while waiting 
for the other repository to be developed, create a system of consol-
idated interim storage to temporarily house SNF; and (3) estab-
lish a program to reprocess SNF. 
All three of these steps should be interrelated. The SNF plan 
should use a consent-based approach to determine the locations 
for future repository and interim storage sites. Part of the process 
for establishing these locations should involve providing incen-
tives to communities that agree to host the sites. This should in-
clude granting priority for funding SNF reprocessing research 
201. Funk & Sovacool, supra note 2, at 140. 
202. Id. 
203. See Carfora, supra note 33, at 169-70. 
204. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
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and development. 205 By tying disposal and storage locations with 
reprocessing, the United States could more easily implement a 
multifaceted approach to solving the SNF problem. 
The last three decades of failed SNF policy prove that a singu-
lar-focused, top-down approach will not work. 206 Instead of boxing 
the nuclear industry into an all-or-nothing plan, the United 
States' SNF policy should take a flexible, iterative approach.201 
The Blue Ribbon Commission has identified the need for this 
change,208 but in order to implement it there must be a significant 
bipartisan political effort coupled with a focus on sound science. 
The United States cannot afford to keep ignoring its nuclear 
waste problem. Regardless of individual opinions about the wis-
dom of nuclear power, SNF is here to stay. 209 The United States 
should move towards a solution by adopting a multidimensional 
approach including reprocessing, consolidated interim storage, 
and eventual permanent SNF disposal. 
Christopher M. Keegan * 
205. See Stewart & Stewart, supra note 14, at 47. 
206. See id. at 78--79 ("NWPA imposed a blueprint for Yucca that defined the key ele-
ments of the repository project at the outset and prescribed a rigid timetable for imple-
mentation."). 
207. See id. (discussing how the Waste Isolation Pilot Program in New Mexico was suc-
cessful because it involved a flexible iterative process). 
208. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON AM.'s NUCLEAR FUTURE, supra note 15, at 31 ("Flexibil-
ity ... is needed because implementing a disposal program will take at least several gen-
erations, during which technology and values are sure to evolve .... "). 
209. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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